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Abstract—The domain name system (DNS) is a crucial back-
bone of the Internet and millions of new domains are created
on a daily basis. While the vast majority of these domains are
legitimate, adversaries also register new hostnames to carry out
nefarious purposes, such as scams, phishing, or other types of
attacks. In this paper, we present insights on the global utilization
of DNS through a measurement study examining exclusively
newly observed hostnames via passive DNS data analysis. We
analyzed more than two billion such hostnames collected over
a period of two months. Surprisingly, we find that only three
second-level domains are responsible for more than half of all
newly observed hostnames every day. More specifically, we found
that Google’s Accelerated Mobile Pages (AMP) project, the music
streaming service Spotify, and a DNS tunnel provider generate
the majority of new domains on the Internet. DNS tunneling
is a covert channel technique to transfer arbitrary information
over DNS via DNS queries and answers. This technique is often
(ab)used by attackers to transfer data in a stealthy way, bypassing
traditional network security systems. We find that potential DNS
tunnels cause a significant fraction of the global DNS requests
for new hostnames: our analysis reveals that nearly all resource
record type NULL requests and more than a third of all TXT
requests can be attributed to DNS tunnels.
Motivated by these empirical measurement results, we propose
and implement a method to identify DNS tunnels via a step-wise
filtering approach that relies on general characteristics of such
tunnels (e.g., number of subdomains or resource record type).
Using our approach on empirical data, we successfully identified
273 suspicious domains related to DNS tunnels, including two
known APT campaigns (Wekby and APT32).
Index Terms—DNS, Newly Observed Hostnames, DNS Tunnel-
ing, Measurement Study
I. INTRODUCTION
The resolution of domain names to IP addresses provided
by the Domain Name System (DNS) is fundamental for
comfortably using the Internet. Every Internet user utilizes this
functionality, thus making it an attractive target for attacks.
As a result, it is important to understand the development and
use of DNS in the wild. Abuses such as DNS as amplification
protocol in the context of DDoS attacks or cache poisoning
attacks are known and have been thoroughly analyzed in pre-
vious publications [1], [2]. In addition, various measurement
studies described the development and changes in the DNS
ecosystem and discussed several aspects, such as interception,
censorship, dependencies, or measurement challenges [3]–[6].
However, a comprehensive analysis of previously unknown or
new requested hostnames has not been performed so far.
In this paper, we conduct a systematic measurement study
on this topic on passive DNS data obtained from the globally
distributed Farsight DNS sensor network [7]. Our analyzed
data set consists of newly observed fully qualified domain
names (FQDNs) only, i.e., it does not contain widely known
domain names like google.com or facebook.com, but only
domains observed being resolved for the very first time.
In total, we analyzed more than two billion such domains
collected over a period of two months.
We found that the majority of these FQDNs do not originate
from an average user surfing the Internet, but are automatically
generated. In a first step, we performed an in-depth structural
analysis of the obtained FQDNs to understand which applica-
tion scenarios require the use of new FQDNs and later on an-
alyze them in detail. We found especially automated requests
from Google’s AMP project, Spotify, and DNS tunnels in our
data set responsible for half of all entries, indicating further
analysis is crucial. From a security perspective, especially
DNS tunneling is interesting because it allows an attacker the
covert transfer of information. Although, many publications
already dealt with DNS tunnels [8]–[22], a comprehensive
global overview of the real-world usage of DNS tunnels is
missing. Therefore, we analyze to what extent DNS tunnels
can be found in a large, aggregated data set of newly observed
hostnames. Furthermore, we search for examples of malicious
activity and conclude that it is an actual real-world threat.
As previously explained, DNS tunnels are hidden, often
not monitored communication channels. Attackers use them
for the extraction of information as well as the establishment
of command and control channels (e.g., FrameworkPOS [23]
or C3PRO-RACCOON [24]). Even advanced persistent threat
(APT) actors use this technique to successfully attack their
targets (e.g., Wekby [25], APT32 [26], or APT34 [27]). The
most recent example of using a DNS tunnel by malware is
from February 2018, a point of sale (POS) malware used it for
data exfiltration (UDPoS [28], [29]). Although the technique
is already known for some time, it is still popular as an attack
vector [30] and therefore it is important to understand usage
in order to identify campaigns that use this technique early on.
Existing efforts to analyze DNS tunnels depend on an internal
network view, i. e., a local network in which the presence of
DNS tunnels is detected and analyzed. However, an overview
on globally distributed sensor data is not possible with these
systems as these approaches use single attributes that would
generate high false positives on such aggregated passive DNS
data, e.g., due to CDNs. In contrast, our approach of examining
passive DNS data with newly observed hostnames from a
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distributed sensor network allows a broad overview of DNS
tunnel usage. In particular, we introduce a step-wise approach
with filter functions which take characteristics of known DNS
tunnels into account to reduce the passive DNS data down to
potential DNS tunnel domains, e.g., number of subdomains
per second-level domain, used resource record type (e.g., A,
TXT, NULL), or level of full hostnames. Thus, we can analyze
the filtered data to understand the extent such tunnels are used
in the wild.
We again analyzed more than two billion passive DNS
entries and discovered 273 candidate domains within resource
record types NULL and TXT, which were potentially used
for DNS tunneling. We observed that almost all type NULL
traffic and about 35 percent of type TXT traffic is related
to DNS tunnels. Additionally, we provide a survey of the
development of DNS tunnel usage by malicious software.
With our analysis approach, we were able to identify two
APT groups (APT32 and Wekby) related to ten second-level
domains in our data set, which we analyze in more detail in
two separate case studies. The Wekby case study proves the
importance of monitoring even old DNS tunnel domains. In
that specific case, we identified a DNS tunnel belonging to an
APT campaign that has been featured in blog posts back in the
year 2016. Nevertheless, we detected activity in our gathered
data, which means that the old infrastructure was still in use
at a much later date. Finally, we discuss threats to validity of
our filtering approach.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
1) We conduct a measurement study of the usage of DNS
requests with new fully qualified domain names on a
passive DNS data set.
2) We provide insights on how DNS tunnels are used in
practice and propose a simple, yet effective collection of
filtering functions for identifying DNS tunnels in passive
DNS data (or rather identifying suspicious domains) and
demonstrate its applicability in practice.
3) We discuss two case studies of APT campaigns using
DNS tunnels (APT32 and Wekby) seen in our collected
data set and present a brief survey of malware utilizing
DNS tunneling techniques.
In the remainder of this paper, we first introduce technical
background information in Section II. Afterwards, we present
our measurement study in Section III, followed by introducing
our approach to identify suspicious domain names in Sec-
tion IV. In Section V, we present the usage of our filter
functions and demonstrate that the resulting candidate domains
are indeed domains used by DNS tunnels. In this data set, we
also discovered domains associated with APT campaigns and
we analyze these findings in two case studies in Section VI.
Subsequent, we discuss limitations of our work in Section VII,
review related work in Section IX, discuss future work in
Section X, and finally conclude in Section XI.
II. BACKGROUND
Before we present our measurement study, we provide basic
information to ease understanding the rest of our paper. First,
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Figure 1. Domain name hierarchy root tree
we describe the DNS and passive DNS data. Afterwards, we
introduce the concept of DNS tunnels.
A. Domain Name System
The Domain Name System (DNS) is hierarchically struc-
tured so that no central database with all DNS information
exists. When a client needs information from the DNS, it
sends a request to a predefined local DNS server. If this server
cannot answer the request, it forwards the request to one of
the root servers. Then the request is forwarded to the server
of the top-level domain, which forwards the request to the
server responsible for the second-level domain. This continues
until a DNS server can provide the appropriate answer. Servers
forwarding a DNS request are referred to as recursive DNS
servers. Accordingly, it is possible to visualize the DNS
namespace as a tree [31] (see Figure 1). The most right part
of a domain is at the topmost position in the hierarchy of
the tree (.[empty]) and the most left part is at the lowest
position (e. g., www). The highest level is called the root.
Topologically below, and thus listed to the left of the root, is
the name of a top-level domain (TLD) (e. g., com). Below the
top-level domain are the names of the second-level domains
(e. g., foo) followed by third-level domains or simply further
labels of lower levels. Each level in a domain is called label.
The full name of a domain is called Fully Qualified Domain
Name (FQDN). Hence, the domain name www.foo.com. is an
FQDN with three levels. A subdomain is a part of an FQDN,
e.g., example.www.foo.com is a subdomain of www.foo.com.
An FQDN’s maximum length is restricted to 256 characters,
effectively it is still necessary to remove the TLD (at least two
characters) and the root (1 character), allowing a maximum
number of 253 characters. The maximum length of individual
labels is defined by 63 characters.
Besides translating memorable domain names into their
corresponding IP addresses, DNS offers further features. Each
DNS request contains an information called resource record
type (rrtype) which encodes the purpose of the corresponding
DNS request: type A and type AAAA resolve domains to IPv4
Client DNS Resolver Content
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Figure 2. Structure of Farsight Passive DNS
or IPv6 addresses, respectively, while type CNAME provides
aliases. Type MX is used to find the matching mail server and
type NS returns the corresponding nameserver. Other types
include, e. g., TXT for transmitting text data and NULL for
arbitrary content. In total, DNS supports 92 different resource
record types [32].
B. Passive DNS
Passive DNS (pDNS) was commercialized in 2002 by Sand-
storm Enterprises in the NetIntercept product which appears
in the work of Corey et al. [33]. In 2004, Weimer introduced
the concept of pDNS as a defense against malware [34].
This concept works as follows: Recursive DNS servers log
requests they receive from other DNS servers. Passive DNS
replicates the received requests from multiple recursive DNS
servers into a central database. In other words, the overall
result is aggregated data. Later on, researchers and analysts can
use pDNS databases, e. g., to discover DNS queries resolved
for a particular domain name, corresponding nameservers or
other zones using the same nameservers. This provides an
opportunity to search for known malicious IP addresses and
find all domain names associated with these IP addresses.
Various companies collect data from recursive DNS servers
(in this context often referred to as pDNS sensors) in large
databases. For example, Farsight operates a globally dis-
tributed passive DNS sensor network, collects the data cen-
trally (DNSDB), and provides access to it via live feeds
(Security Information Exchange (SIE)) [7]. The advantage of
these live feeds is that the raw data can be saved, including
all seen DNS requests, but also prefiltered data, e. g., only
new FQDNs that makes it comfortable for further analysis.
Figure 2 shows the structure of Farsight pDNS. We expect
Farsight to receive a significant fraction of all DNS requests
observable in the wild due to the worldwide distribution of
pDNS sensors [35].
A pDNS entry contains various information like a timestamp
and a message field. Table I presents an exemplary pDNS
message field from the second-level domain teriava.com. It is
a dictionary including all relevant information, in particular:
1) Domain field: the used second-level domain.
2) rrname field: the FQDN, i.e., the domain with all sub-
domains.
3) rrtype field: resource record type of the DNS request.
Table I
PDNS MESSAGE DICTIONARY EXAMPLE (WE OMITTED THE FIELDS KEYS
AND NEW RR SINCE THEIR VALUES ARE EMPTY IN OUR EXAMPLE)
field value
domain teriava.com.
time seen 2017-07-01 09:35:04
bailiwick teriava.com.
rrname dsu9jr2czl.teriava.com.
rrclass IN
rrtype A
rdata [”127.0.0.1”]
4) rdata field: the information for the DNS request re-
sponse.
The bailiwick field indicates the authoritative server [36].
It is used by Farsight to avoid falsely accepting DNS results
from untrustworthy sources. The other fields are not necessary
for the further course of our work.
C. DNS Tunneling
Besides the primary purpose of the DNS protocol, namely
to query different types of data related to a specific domain, it
is possible to use the hierarchical infrastructure to send data
over it. The DNS requests of the queried domains go through
the recursive hierarchy of the DNS up to the authoritative
nameserver. A requirement to use DNS tunnels is the access
to a domain and a DNS server (authoritative nameserver),
which receives the DNS requests for the domain. The admin
of an authoritative nameserver can observe all incoming DNS
queries. Therefore, the answers to the queries are under control
of that admin, too. This behavior offers the admin a way
to receive and send data (data exfiltration/infiltration), i. e.,
to establish a two-way communication channel. In particular,
one-way communication (upstream) can be particularly hard
to detect since it may be used very stealthy. The advantages of
DNS tunneling include that DNS is almost always available, no
direct connection is established between victim and attacker,
and pure data exfiltration (upstream only) is difficult to detect.
Note, we focus on DNS tunnels transferring data inside
hostnames. Our research in Section IV (as well as previously
known malware see Section IV-B and the use of various DNS
tunnel tools see Section IV-A) showed that this type of tunnel
is most common in practice, and we thus concentrated on this
technique in the rest of this paper.
DNS tunnels have two closely related main purposes. First,
establishing a communication channel between two hosts
which are not allowed to communicate with each other.
Second, exchanging information in an obfuscated way. Many
public networks require their customers to login before surfing
and use DNS to display a captive portal. The availability of
DNS enables a customer to use a DNS tunnel and establish
a connection with a DNS server under her control to surf the
Internet. Even worse, an intruder can use a DNS tunnel in an
internal network to exfiltrate information, such as passwords,
or receive commands from an outside server. Since DNS is
often not monitored, this way of exchanging information often
remains undetected and has already been successfully used by
malware (see Sections IV-B and VI).
III. MEASUREMENT STUDY ON THE USAGE OF NEW
FULLY QUALIFIED DOMAIN NAMES (FQDNS)
In the following, we present the results of a measurement
study of newly observed hostnames to understand the pos-
sibilities of pDNS data analysis. Thereby, we focus on DNS
requests with new fully qualified domain names (FQDN) only.
We want to explore the reasons for requests with new host-
names since these are not conventional resolutions generated
by a user surfing the Internet. Additionally, we analyze the
distributions of resource record types and the utilization of
second-level domains with most subdomains.
A. Data Set Description
Farsight provided us access to their data live feed (channel
213). This feed is pre-filtered in terms of it is processing
only newly observed hostnames (FQDNs). In other words it
means we only see FQDNs that have not been observed by
Farsight before. However, of course we see also already known
second-level domains such like ampproject.net. The term new
refers to the full hostnames (e.g., new.example.ampproject.net).
We stored the live feed for about two months between June
30th, 2017 and September 1st, 2017. In July and August,
more than two billion (2,041,665,066) pDNS entries were
collected and saved (∼800GBytes). The mean count per day is
32,930,081.71, the median is 34,374,936.5, and the standard
deviation is 3,171,327.81. The data set is large despite the
limitation to new FQDNs, but still tiny compared to all
DNS requests in total on the Internet, e. g., Google DNS
servers receive about 400 billion requests a day [37]. Our later
performed analyses are thus supported by our data set, which
is prefiltered by Farsight.
B. General Measurement Results
Our analysis starts with statistics on various information
that can be obtained via pDNS data and then we present an
in-depth analysis with enriched network and manual search
information.
Distribution resource record types (rrtype): Table II sums
up the pDNS entry counts by rrtype and the share related to
the total observed data between June and August 2017. It is
noteworthy that in total 21 different rrtypes occur, although
the primary task of DNS is the resolution of hostnames into
IP addresses, represented by rrtype A and AAAA, for IPv4
and IPv6, respectively. Type A entries make up just over half
of all entries (almost 55 %). The proportion of AAAA rrtype
entries is rather low with almost 10 %. More than 95 % of
the entries represent five different types (A, NULL, AAAA,
CNAME, TXT, ordered by frequency). The remaining amount
is distributed among the types NS, MX and others, including
SOA, WKS, PTR, DNAME, RP, HINFO, SRV, SPF, NAPTR,
TLSA, LOC, SSHFP, CAA and DHCID.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the seen resource record
types over time. The distributions remain stable over the
Table II
DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCE RECORD TYPE ENTRIES IN THE PDNS DATA
SET (JUN-AUG)
Type # Count Share
A 1,121,025,638 54.90%
AAAA 197,388,865 9.67%
MX 682,948 0.03%
NS 7,662,147 0.38%
CNAME 156,708,021 7.68%
TXT 41,593,164 2.04%
NULL 432,232,574 21.17%
Others 84,371,709 4.13%
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Others
NS
TXT
CNAME
AAAA
NULL
A
Figure 3. Percentage distribution of resource record types over time
measurement period and therefore demonstrate that we analyze
a rather robust and representative data set. NS type records
and CNAME type records together represent a maximum of
under ten percent per day. Surprising is the large proportion
of type NULL entries, such entries represent up to 30 %
of the total traffic every day. In total, about 21 % are of
type NULL. According to RFC 1035 from 1987, this type
is only experimental [31]. The rrtype TXT also make up a
notable proportion of these entries. All other rrtypes were
rarely observed in the wild.
Distribution second-level domains to FQDNs: The most
remarkable observation is that a small amount of second-
level domain names are responsible for a large number of
FQDNs. This insight implies that a few second-level domains
generate a massive volume of subdomains. Figure 4 illustrates
this behavior in a cumulative distribution function (CDF). The
black line represents all entries with all record types, whereas
the orange one represents type A, the red line NULL, the
blue line TXT, and the yellow line CNAME. The CDF for
all types (black line) indicates that roughly three second-level
domain names are responsible for about 50 % of the total
newly observed FQDNs. About 23 second-level domain names
are responsible for 80 %. Additionally, we can see that the
rise of the curve is slowly flattening, which means that many
second-level domain names have very few new FQDNs. The
curve for record type A (orange line) is almost identical to
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Figure 4. Cumulative distribution function for second-level domain names
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Figure 5. Distribution of FQDN levels over time
the curve for all entries. It is noteworthy that especially type
NULL and TXT contain even fewer domains, accounting for
a major part of the total entries. In contrast to this behavior,
the curve of type CNAME is flattened, which shows a broader
distribution of second-level domains to FQDNs. We investigate
these domains in more detail in Section III-C.
Number of levels in the domain: For the following evalu-
ations, we count the TLD node as the first level. The FQDN
www.example.com. therefore has level three. As expected,
more than 50 % of the observed domains have a level three or
lower in their rrname field. These requests are usually simple
IP address resolutions that occur when using the Internet
and thus adapts to the rrtype distribution (type A ∼55%).
Nevertheless, the proportion of on average level five or lower
is about 30 % and about 20 % of the observed domains have
more than five levels. This kind of queries are not common
and may have different reasons (e.g., content delivery networks
(CDNs) or DNS tunnel) See Figure 5 for the distribution of
the number of levels in the FQDN over time.
Distribution rdata sizes: The rdata field represents the an-
swer to the corresponding DNS query. Typically, the response
should include an IP address, since DNS mainly translates
domain names into IP addresses. The maximum size of 100
bytes including the dots and brackets should be sufficient for
this purpose. Nevertheless, a remarkable proportion contains
more than 100 bytes. Figure 6 shows this distribution over
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Figure 7. Scatter plot for distribution of the rdata size mean values over the
whole data set
time. The blue color represents all sizes up to 100 bytes (100),
orange are the sizes up to 1000 bytes (1000) and grey are
the sizes over 1000 bytes (Others). Approximately 17.5 % of
rdata fields are between 100 and 1000 bytes in size. A tiny
proportion is even larger than 1000 bytes.
Figure 7 shows a scatter plot with the distribution of the
average rdata field sizes over the whole data set. It is evident
that a substantial part has tiny rdata sizes matching to domain
to IP address resolutions since they include just IP addresses,
but there are outliers on the X-axis, which have large rdata
sizes.
C. Additional Analyses and Results
Our results show a small number of domains is responsible
for many DNS requests with new FQDNs. In the following,
we explain the purpose of these domains. Regarding the two
months of our pDNS data set, the domains in Table III are the
top 10 domains with most DNS requests with new FQDNs.
The domain names ampproject.net, 53.de, and spotilocal.com
alone represent more than 50 % of the total traffic with new
FQDNs in our data set. The domain name ampproject.net
belongs to the Google Accelerated Mobile Pages (AMP)
project, which aims at accelerating access to mobile websites
faster [38]. The domain name 53r.de belongs to a German
DNS tunnel provider, also the other three-character domain
names 8u6.de and 1yf.de are part of it (see Section V).
Together, these three-character domain names make up a
Table III
TOP 10 SECOND-LEVEL DOMAINS WITH MOST PDNS ENTRIES
Domain name Count Share
ampproject.net 681,017,564 33.37 %
53r.de 192,389,690 9.43 %
spotilocal.com 191,628,848 9.39 %
8u6.de 185,147,960 9.07 %
1yf.de 125,973,029 6.17 %
mts.ru 52,553,371 2.58 %
imrworldwide.com 35,496,798 1.74 %
dotnxdomain.net 23,290,118 1.14 %
cnr.io 20,820,485 1.02 %
dynapsis.info 19,784,924 0.97 %
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Figure 8. Behavior of the top 10 second-level domains with most pDNS
entries over time
quarter of the total data. The domain name spotilocal.com
in third place corresponds to the music streaming provider
Spotify [39]. The Spotify Desktop Client uses a web server
running on localhost. The spotilocal.com domain points to
the Spotify localhost server and uses randomly generated
subdomains to bypass browser limitations on the number
of running concurrent connections to the same domain. The
fourth domain mts.ru is related to the mobile provider Mobile
TeleSystems in Russia. The remaining domains are related
to spyware (imrworldwide.com), DNSSEC (dotnxdomain.net),
canary/decoy tools (cnr.io), and a content management system
(dynapsis.info).
An overview of the number of subdomains per domain for
the top 10 domains over time is given in Figure 8. It illustrates
that the amount of FQDNs per day remains rather stable for
almost all top 10 second-level domains. There is an increase
in ampproject.net, which confirms that the AMP project is
widely used and will likely be used more and more due to
the increasing number of mobile devices. In addition, a linear
regression analysis proves that the trend is significantly rising.
Furthermore, there was a descent at 1yf.de at the end of July
and a continuous reduction at mts.ru.
Most of the used resource record types among the top 10
domains with most pDNS entries are of type A (as expected).
Except for the three-character .de domains, which do not use
A resource records at all. About 73 % of all ampproject.net
entries are of type A and even all spotilocal.com entries are of
this type because these always resolve to localhost. Comparing
the second-level domains with the most entries between type A
and AAAA, it is noticeable that ampproject.net is responsible
for most entries for both types. In case of type A, this domain
accounts for almost half of all queries and in case of type
AAAA, it accounts for more than 92 %. Almost all requests for
mts.ru are of type A like almost all requests for dynapsis.info.
Requests to imrworldwide.com are of type CNAME.
Additionally, pDNS analysis might be used to measure the
popularity of services. An increase in requests for spotilo-
cal.com, e. g., is an indication that Spotify is used more.
Another example would be the use of Netflix using the
domains netflixdnstest2.com and netflixdnstest4.com of type
AAAA or nflxo.com of type CNAME. It is thus feasible
to leverage pDNS to quantify the popularity from services
that use DNS with new hostnames. Note that the number of
requested CDN domains in the domain field is negligible (less
than 1 % concerning the entire data set). Table IV contains
information with the top ten second-level domains for resource
record type A, AAAA, CNAME, and NS.
A more in-depth analysis of the record types NULL and
TXT is worthwhile because these can transfer any data in their
response field and thus fit for sending arbitrary information in
a two-way communication channel well. Additionally, previ-
ously known malware and tools use DNS tunnel with these
particular types.
In summary, new hostnames are mainly used in three
scenarios: usage by the Google AMP Project, utilization by
Spotify, and DNS Tunnels. These three scenarios account for
the majority of the collected data. Especially, the DNS tunnel
aspect is interesting from a security perspective. Moreover, the
large share of type NULL is unexpected.
IV. IDENTIFYING SUSPICIOUS SECOND LEVEL DOMAIN
NAMES IN NEWLY OBSERVED HOSTNAMES
We have seen in the results of our empirical measurements
that DNS tunnels are used a lot in practice. Next, we introduce
an approach to identify potential suspicious domain names that
may serve as DNS tunnels with the help of the information
obtained from our measurement study. First, we show the
possibility to detect and further distinguish between multiple
DNS tunnel setups in local networks and extract attributes
we can use to find DNS tunnels in the pDNS data. To make
DNS tunnel detection efficient, we then introduce a filtering
pipeline using the previously identified attributes and results
of our conducted measurement study that reduces the size of
the data set to simplify subsequent analyses.
A. Structural Analysis of DNS Tunnels
All DNS tunnel tools are easy to identify with an internal
network view, e.g., monitoring the DNS resolver of a company
network (see [9]–[15]). Tunnel tools significantly increase the
number of requests (up to 2000% more requests [40]), making
identification often easy. However, as the Internet has changed
in recent years, this is no longer correct in all cases. In
particular, for the identification of DNS tunnels in aggregated
Table IV
TOP 10 SECOND-LEVEL DOMAINS PER TYPE A, AAAA, CNAME, AND NS
Type A Type AAAA
2nd level domain # Count Share 2nd level domain # Count Share
ampproject.net. 499,006,190 44.1 % ampproject.net. 182,009,815 91.7 %
spotilocal.com. 191,628,848 16.9 % fbcdn.net. 4,083,343 2.1 %
mts.ru. 52,531,398 4.6 % dotnxdomain.net. 4,030,857 2.0 %
dynapis.info. 19,174,477 4.1 % ipv6test.com. 1,814,088 0.9 %
tekblue.net. 17,640,133 1.7 % infernotions.com. 1,516,583 0.8 %
dotnxdomain.net. 15,582,070 1.4 % ipleak.net. 970,214 0.5 %
beeline.ru. 12,279,081 1.1 % dynapis.info. 610,447 0.3 %
netease.com. 6,959,973 0.6 % ripe.net. 529,969 0.3 %
ipv6test.com. 6,947,460 0.6 % netflixdnstest2.com. 120,591 0.1 %
internetvikings.com. 4,856,694 0.4 % netflixdnstest4.com. 120,050 0.1 %
Type CNAME Type NS
2nd level domain # Count Share 2nd level domain # Count Share
imrworldwide.com. 35,496,795 22.4 % dotnxdomain.net. 495,525 6.3 %
igsonar.com. 14,239,271 9.0 % dnsunions.net. 90,687 1.2 %
nflxso.net. 12,037,681 7.6 % 154.in-addr.arpa. 88,902 1.1 %
1drv.com. 5,106,992 3.2 % cu.cc. 78,532 1.0 %
sarahah.com. 3,914,675 2.5 % qq.com. 62,411 0.8 %
lostmy.name. 3,862,838 2.4 % superspeedcdn.com. 50,193 0.6 %
surveymonkey.com. 2,088,226 1.3 % masimo.com. 42,904 0.5 %
messenger.com. 1,915,001 1.2 % 23.in-addr.arpa. 40,072 0.5 %
seek.com.au. 1,888,242 1.2 % goallurl.ru. 39,111 0.5 %
workable.com. 1,845,901 1.2 % extrahop.com. 27,355 0.3 %
global data, such as our Farsight data, the number of requests
alone is not sufficient. It is not usable because nowadays there
are many scenarios where many requests are sent to a second-
level domain (e.g. see Section III Google AMP, Spotify, or
also CDNs). For this reason, we need to find more attributes
that can be used to identify DNS tunnels.
To first differentiate between DNS tunnel implementations,
we built a test network. In this network, we tested different
DNS tunnel tools under laboratory conditions, generated traffic
and saved it in PCAP files. By analyzing the generated PCAPs,
we were able to identify attributes that help to distinguish the
individual DNS tunnel tools. Therefore, we not only attempt
to distinguish DNS tunnel traffic from regular DNS traffic, but
also to determine the responsible DNS tunnel tool itself.
In our experiments, we used the following set of DNS tunnel
tools: iodine [41], dns2tcp [42], dnscat2 [43], dnscat [44],
and OzymanDNS [45] as these are well-known DNS tunnel
tools [46], [47]. The tool iodine was first released in 2006 by
Ekman and Andersson. It tunnels IPv4 packets through DNS
and, thus, can be used for any protocol that runs on IPv4. It
works on major Linux systems, Mac OS and Windows. The
tool dns2tcp was developed by Demvour and Collignon in
2008 and tunnels TCP traffic trough DNS. The tool dnscat2
is the successor of dnscat that was released in 2004 as a
Java based DNS tunneling tool. OzymanDNS is a Perl tool
developed by Kaminsky in 2004 for tunneling SSH over
DNS. Table IV-A summarizes our utilized implementations
with information about the latest commit of each tool and
the supported resource record types. We used iodine not
only with the standard configuration (record type NULL)
Table V
UTILIZED DNS TUNNEL IMPLEMENTATIONS
tool latest commit types source
iodine 2018
NULL,
PRIVATE,
TXT, SRV,
MX, A,
CNAME
[41]
dns2tcp 2017 TXT [42]
dnscat2 2015
TXT,
CNAME,
MX
[43]
dnscat 2005 CNAME [44]
OzymanDNS 2004 TXT [45]
but also with type TXT, MX, SRV, CNAME, and A. In
comparison, DNS2tcp uses type TXT, dnscat2 utilizes three
types (alternating CNAME, MX and NULL during operation),
dnscat utilizes CNAME and OzymanDNS leverages type TXT.
In addition to the DNS tunnel tools, we also tested two
DNS tunnel providers, your-freedom.com and tunnelguru.com.
The difference between a DNS tunnel tool and a DNS tunnel
provider is that the provider allocates the necessary infras-
tructure, which we have to set up with a DNS tunnel tool
ourselves. In our experiments, the two tunnel providers used
the type NULL.
In total, we tested 12 different DNS tunnel implementations
(five tools extended with iodine in five different configurations
and two providers). For each implementation, we extracted the
most common values per attribute from our created PCAP
files. With this information, we created classes for each
implementation in which possible values for the respective im-
plementation are available. During our analysis, the following
eight attributes proved feasible to tell apart the DNS tunnel
tools:
1) length of the FQDN without the third-level domain
2) number of levels
3) length of the fourth-level domain
4) length of the fifth-level domain
5) resource record type
6) whether an encoding was used or not
7) special characters at the beginning of the FQDN, and
8) embedded particular substrings
When a FQDN is mapped to the implementations, the values
for the attributes are extracted from the examined domain and
compared to each appropriate attribute per implementation.
We tested in various experiments how many attributes
should match in order to assume the examined FQDN to be
associated comparable to the corresponding implementation.
We defined that at least six matching attributes out of eight
attributes represent similarly implementations. With this sim-
ple method, we were able to assign 97% of all seen DNS
requests to the correct implementation in our generated data.
When using yourfreedom.com, it is noticeable that a three-
character .de domain is always used (in our test cases
53r.de). After further manual research we were able to assign
other three-character .de domains to yourfreedom.com namely
8u6.de, 1yf.de, and 2yf.de [48]. Through this experiment, we
are now able to identify three-character .de domains as DNS
tunnel domains. When using tunnelguru.com, it is noticeable
that a set of 53 three-character .in domains are used in our
experiments. The second-level domains randomly change per
session through the set of TLDs. With this experiment, we can
assign the seen three-character .in domains to a DNS tunnel
provider, too.
B. Known Malware Utilizing DNS Tunneling
Besides the tools tested in our lab environment, we also
analyzed a number of DNS tunnels that have been used in
malware or by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups. In
the following, we provide a brief survey of the development
of the use of DNS tunnels of malware.
In general, previously known DNS tunnel malware can be
categorized by type of DNS usage, i. e., C2 communication or
data exfiltration. In addition, it is also possible to group them
according to the type of malware or type of attack target. There
is malware for payment terminals, malware for bot distribution
and control, and malware for targeted network attacks. Overall,
it is noteworthy that the examples of malware described in the
following always use type NULL or TXT. The utilization of
both types is reasonable, as text data or even any kind of
data may be transmitted in the response. Thus, a two-way
communication is ideal to implement.
In August 2011, attention was drawn to the Morto
worm [49], which used a DNS tunnel for C2 communication.
In the same year in September, another malware was analyzed
(Feederbot) [50]. Feederbot is a botnet malware that also uses
DNS as a C2 communication channel. At the beginning of
2014, a remote access Trojan appeared (PlugX Variants) [51],
of which a module implements C2 communication via DNS.
In October 2014, a malware (FrameworkPOS) was discovered
that implements data exfiltration using DNS requests [23]. It
targets Point of Sale (POS) systems. Another POS malware
that also uses DNS as an exfiltration channel is Bernhard-
POS from November 2015 [52]. In 2016, there were several
malware samples and APT groups that used DNS tunnels
for their purposes [24], [25], [27], [53], [54]. Multigrain
is a POS malware using DNS as exfiltration channel [53].
C3PRO-RACCOON used DNS tunnels for establishing a C2
communication channel during a botnet campaign [24]. The
APT groups APT34 and Wekby both make use of DNS tunnels
for C2 communication [25], [27]. In particular, the Oilrig
campaign in May and October used DNS as a communication
channel by the malware Helminth and ISMAgent [54]. This
campaign is loosely aligned with APT34. The Remote Access
Trojan DNSMessenger was discovered in March 2017 [55].
Moreover, in 2017, the APT32 group and another malware
(Alma Communicator) from Oilrig became noticeable [26],
[56]. The latest malware in 2018 is UDPoS and it is a POS
malware that uses DNS for data exfiltration [28], [29].
C. Filtering approach
We use some of these common and uncommon attributes for
the reduction of our data and spotting potential DNS tunnel
domain names in course of a step-wise filtering. More specifi-
cally, the lessons learned from Sections III, IV-A and IV-B help
us to develop a filter approach for the aggregated pDNS data
for a second measurement study on the use of DNS tunnels in
the wild. The following filter functions are carefully created
manually based on our insights.
1) Number of subdomains.
2) Level of full domain (FQDN).
3) Resource record type (rrtype).
4) Size of response (rdata).
5) Known non-DNS tunnel use cases e. g., DNS-based mail
authentication or reverse DNS lookups.
6) Known second-level domains.
7) Entropy.
8) Character or bigram frequency [9].
Note that we do not need an in-depth analysis of the
responses since we want to detect besides two-way communi-
cation channels (up and downstream) also upstream-only chan-
nels which do not need any responses (6). In addition, we do
not use the already known attributes entropy (7) and character
or bigram frequencies (8) but focus on the information that we
can obtain directly from the pDNS data without any further
processing. With five features, we developed our step-wise
filtering approach for the identification of DNS tunnels. The
resource record type is an excellent prefiltering attribute since
our observations during the measurement study verify it as
a good starting point to effectively reduce a large amount of
pDNS data. The level of the FQDN, the number of subdomains
per second-level domain, known non-DNS tunnel use cases,
and known second-level domains are further attributes we
utilize to reduce the data set.
It is worth noting that we do not refer to local data with
information per client but to pDNS data, which allows us to
make statements on the global usage of new FQDNs. In local
networks, the number of subdomains to a second-level domain
is usually enough to detect a DNS tunnel. With our aggregated
data this does not work anymore because, otherwise, we would
get a lot of false positives [57]. However, the combination of
five filter functions allows us to identify DNS tunnels even in
aggregated data.
Figure 9 illustrates the approach for filtering our gathered
pDNS data for potential suspicious DNS tunnel domains. As
input, we use the gathered pDNS data from Farsight SIE.
During our measurement study in Section III and the DNS
tunnel survey that we conducted in Section IV-A and Sec-
tion IV-B, we discovered that tunnels predominantly use type
NULL or TXT. Therefore, in a first step, we prefilter for the
corresponding resource record types (0). The other types, like
A or AAAA, are filtered out because we found that in theory
tunnels can be implemented with these types but in practice,
they are not used. DNS tunnels utilize types like NULL or
TXT because these can transmit arbitrary information. After
prefiltering, further filter functions are applied. We begin with
filtering functions that remove as much as possible at the very
beginning in order to make the following filtering and analyses
execute on small data sets. It is necessary that the steps are
all performed to ensure proper results. Note that for a detailed
analysis, the results of the individual filter steps may be saved,
analyzed, and more customized.
We start by filtering known second-level domains (1). For
the known domains, we use a list of known CDN domains
and already known tunnel domains.
After that, we filter for requested FQDNs with at least
level four (2). We observed that DNS tunnel FQDNs usually
include a short constant third-level domain below the second-
level domain. A third-level domain is mostly required as it
is elaborate to get an authoritative DNS server for second-
level domains. However, theoretically tunnels could also use
second-level domains for transferring information. The tunnels
we investigated avoid this extra effort (i.e., running a DNS
server) by merely using a third-level domain. Additionally, the
third-level domain is short because the FQDN should encode
as much information as possible since the length of an FQDN
and the length of its subdomains itself are limited.
Next, we filter for at least two different subdomains per
second-level domain (3). When using DNS tunnels for data
transmission the straightforward way is to embed data inside
the requested FQDN. Thus, a certain number of subdomains
must always be generated, since most data transfers are larger
than the data size that can be sent in a single DNS request. In
other words, data must be split into smaller packets and then
processed with many DNS requests in order to transmit it via
DNS tunnels.
In the last step (4), we filter for known non-DNS tunnel
usage patterns. For example, the .arpa TLD entries, which
are used exclusively for infrastructure purposes [31], or DNS-
based mail authentication mechanisms such as the Sender
Policy Framework (SPF) [58] or DomainKeys [59].
After using our step-by-step filter approach, a reduced data
set with potentially suspicious candidate domains remains.
This should then be checked manually by an analyst to
finally decide whether the domain candidates are DNS tunnel
domains or not.
V. FILTERING RESULTS
In the following, we present the results of our filtering
approach to identify potential DNS tunnel domains. First, we
test our step-wise filtering method by checking each filter func-
tion on self-generated traffic. Next, we discuss the results by
prefiltering resource record type NULL and TXT since these
types are used by well-known malware (see Section IV-B),
and six out of seven tested tools or providers support them
too (see Section IV-A). To complete this, we consider results
for prefiltering by other types, e.g., CNAME.
A. Filter Function Evaluation
First, we demonstrate that our individual filtering steps
are applicable and do not filter known DNS tunnel packets.
We examine the individual filter functions on self-generated
DNS tunnel data. In addition, we analyze DNS data from a
standard computer for about one month (12th Oct 2018 to
9th Nov 2018). We did not observe a single type NULL or
TXT packet. In the reverse experiment, we confirmed that the
tunnel implementations mostly utilize types NULL or TXT.
The subsequent filtering for at least level four also does not
reduce any further entries from our tunnel PCAPs, as well as
filtering for at least two subdomains per second-level domain.
This, therefore, confirms that our filter sequence does not
remove any potential DNS tunnel domains from our tested
implementations.
B. NULL Domains
The results of the prefiltering by type NULL show that a
total of almost 99 percent of this type represents DNS tunnel
traffic (three-character .de, see Section IV-A). By applying our
further filter steps, 96 potential DNS tunnel domains remain.
According to manual analysis, these domains contain four
domains that are related to an APT campaign (APT 32). The
remaining domains are potential DNS tunnel domains, 35 of
which are unknown so far. About 80 percent of these domains
are iodine-like domains.
1) Detailed filtering steps:
Prefiltering: After filtering by record type NULL, we
reduced the whole data set by more than 70 % so that 96
different second-level domains with 439,463,986 pDNS entries
remain as our NULL domains.
Known domains: The filtered data set still contains three-
character .de domains (53r.de, 8u6.de, 1yf.de, and 2yf.de),
which all belong to a DNS tunnel provider as learned in
Section IV-A). The share of these four second-level domains is
more than 99 %, i. e., almost the entire type NULL traffic can
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Figure 9. Workflow of our filtering of pDNS data. As input we use our gathered pDNS data. Next, our filter pipeline begins with prefiltering regarding
resource record type. Afterwards, we apply further filter steps (known domains, minumum level, minimum number of subdomains per second-level domain,
special use cases). Consequently, we obtain a reduced data set which can then be manually examined by an analyst to decide whether it is a possible tunnel
domain or not.
be classified as DNS tunnel traffic. The second most common
category of domains are three-character .in domains, which
we can also connect to a DNS tunnel provider (again see
Section IV-A). The total amount of three-character .in domains
is 1,120,114 (0,25%) and belongs to 52 second-level domains
(e. g., qv4.in, mm4.in, na2.in, etc.). Therefore, we conclude
that NULL traffic should always be paid special attention to.
Min. level and min. #subdomains: We filtered by level (min.
level four) and by the number of subdomains (min. two FQDN
per second-level domain), which did not remove any further
entries.
Special use cases: With NULL traffic, we did not consider
any special use cases and therefore did not perform further
filtering in this step.
Manual analysis: In the following, we discuss more infor-
mation about the remaining domains. Therefore, we remove
the known three-character domains resulting in 40 second-
level domain candidates with 1,900,389 pDNS entries for other
possible DNS tunnels. After a manually performed Google
web search, we were able to identify dashnxdomain.net as
a non-DNS tunnel domain. The remaining 39 second-level
domains showed typical DNS tunnel behavior, including a
lot of requests in a short period of time and randomly
generated subdomains. Furthermore, we identified four domain
names (gl-appspot.org, facebook-cdn.net, tonholding.com, and
nsquery.net) that were used by APT group APT32 (see Sec-
tion VI-A for details).
Finally, we analyzed the remaining 35 domains in more
details (see Table VI). Initially, we categorized these domains
based on Google search results into four groups. We differen-
tiated between the group Service-related (∼26%), such as Web
applications or blogs, the group Organization-related (∼11%)
which includes companies, the group Private-related (∼29%),
wherein individuals use tunnels, and the group Others (∼34%),
in which it became difficult to find a precise explanation. We
investigated that the third-level domain tunnel or tunnel2 is
used by four second-level domains (daemonslayer.net, eth-
icalreporting.org, ambrisiko.com, and bgasecurity.com). The
third-level domains t, t1, and t1ns are used by eight second-
level domains out of the groups Private and Others. And the
third-level domains tunz, iodine, iodinens are used by four
second-level domains. All these domains give a clear sign
for being tunnel domains since their third-level domains are
rather short and refer textual to tunnels. For the remaining
19 domains, we do not have an extra indicator for DNS
tunnel usage, but the behavior is, in any case, DNS tunnel
comparable.
As a final step, we assigned the remaining domain names
to our tested DNS tunnel implementations. We could match
almost 80% of the traffic to iodine in the default settings.
C. TXT Domains
The results of prefiltering by type TXT show that a total of
about 35 percent of this type represents DNS tunnel traffic.
By applying our further automated filter steps, 233 potential
DNS tunnel domains remain. According to manual analysis,
these domains contain different domains that are related to
companies, universities, video streaming, and potential DNS
tunnel domains. Finally, we found another APT campaign
(Wekby) here as well.
1) Detailed filtering steps:
Prefiltering: Filtering type TXT reduces the data set by
more than 97 % so that 175.852 second-level domains with
42.175.478 pDNS entries remain. In this case, considerably
more second-level domains with far less FQDNs compared to
the NULL domains.
Known domains: The second-level domain with most sub-
domains is cnr.io. This domain belongs to Canary Tools (by
Thinkst Applied Research) and can, therefore, be filtered.
This step allows us to remove more than 21 million entries
and further halve the reduced data set. Furthermore, it is
conspicuous that three-character .de domains are prevalent
here, too (14,971,251 entries). About 35 % of the domains
in our TXT domains are related to DNS tunnels because we
already know them as DNS tunnel domains and can filter them
accordingly (see Section IV-A).
Min. level and min. #subdomains: Since the number of
potential domains presumably related to DNS tunnels, which
we refer to as domain candidates is still high, they cannot
be validated by hand. We use further filtering based on the
level (min. level four) and at least two FQDNs per second-
level domain. These filter steps reduce the data set to 7,700
potential DNS tunnel candidates.
Table VI
REMAINING SECOND-LEVEL DOMAINS AFTER FILTERING BY TYPE NULL AND KNOWN DOMAINS
second-level domain bailiwick # FQDNs # days iodine-like group
dicksin.me. sub.dicksin.me 1,044,739 5 y Others
toc.sc. de.toc.sc 387,435 36 y Service
daemonslayer.net. tunnel.daemonslayer.net 103,081 2 y Service
2cb262aa-...-4b772a5ee2df.ca. 2cb262aa-...-4b772a5ee2df.ca. 74,261 3 n Others
ro.lt. tunz.ro.lt 62,740 1 y Others
uk.to. tunz.uk.to 42,398 2 y Service
itsaunixsystem.net. t.itsaunixsystem.net 36,006 1 y Private
mooo.com. purple-cow.mooo.com 18,177 9 n Service
mst-pro.ru. d2.mst-pro.ru 14,080 4 y Organization
opusbit.com. i.opusbit.com 10,956 3 y Service
uux1.com. uu.uux1.com 8,353 5 n Others
dillonbeliveau.com. t1.dillionbeliveau.com 8,097 1 y Private
cehturkiye.com. vpn.cehturkiye.com 5,048 3 y Service
azvw.org. io.azvw.org 4,888 1 y Service
fajri.info. fajri.info 4,877 1 n Private
cokeduptrading.com. iodinens.cokeduptrading.com 4,067 2 y Others
ethicalreporting.org. tunnel.ethicalreporting.org 3,148 1 y Organization
insmedportal.com. t.insmedportal.com 3,037 1 y Others
allconnect.com. metuchen.allconnect.com 3,014 2 y Service
clubarsenal.ru. home.clubarsenal.ru 2,975 3 y Private
ab0.tj. io.ab0.tj 2,863 1 y Others
zensecurity.su. d.zensecurity.su 2,352 1 y Organization
pwnintended.com. t1ns.pwnintended.com. 754 1 y Others
vorner.cz. dnsvpn.vorner.cz 718 1 y Private
zestysoft.com. t1.zestysoft.com 408 1 y Private
us.to. blipi.us.to 209 2 y Others
x86sec.com. iodine.x86sec.com 100 1 y Service
vasi.li. t.vasi.li 94 2 y Private
khashaev.ru. ns.khashaev.ru 22 1 y Private
getgaze.com. i2.getgaze.com 17 2 n Others
ambrisko.com. tunnel2.ambrisko.com 4 1 n Private
notf2pool.com. d.notf2pool.com 4 2 n Others
thegnet.tk. t1.thegnet.tk 4 1 n Private
plak.cc. t.t.plak.cc 3 1 n Others
bgasecurity.com. tunnel.bgasecurity.com 3 1 n Organization
Special use cases: In the next step, we reduced known non-
DNS tunnel use cases from the data set. We removed DNS
mail authentication mechanisms (e. g., SPF, DKIM, DMARC,
DomainKeys) and rDNS requests. Due to the different filter-
ing, it was possible to reduce the number of potential domains
to 233.
Manual analysis: When looking at the domains with most
FQDNs, it is noticeable that some companies and universi-
ties appear, for example arcticwolf.net, extrahop.com, berke-
ley.edu, or nlnetlabs.nl. The domain with most of the pDNS
entries is ksx.la and seems to be related to the domain knb.la
because the structure of the FQDNs (length, level, random-
ization) and the behavior (many subdomains) is identical for
both second-level domains. We have a total of 15 second-level
domains seen every day. In these domains we recognize the
following five groups.
1) company domain names such as arcticwolf.net, extra-
hop.com, or brightmail.com. (A total of six domains can
be counted as company domains)
2) video streaming domains, i. e., erlyvideo.org.
3) universities or nonprofit organizations such as berke-
ley.edu or nlnetlabs.nl.
4) the domains dsipsl.net, dsomc.net, dsoml.net, and
dsrmc.net seem to belong together by structure.
5) other domains that we can not assign (pf-d.ca and
ymapp.com).
Next we filter the daily seen second-level domains. After
filtering these, there are 216 domain candidates left to check.
The domains which only have one entry left after filtering
are removable as it is not possible to create a useful tunnel.
This led us to 156 domain candidates. A further correlation
with the Alexa top one million domains allows reducing the
number of domain candidates by another 28 domains since
we assume the Alexa top one million domains are not used
for DNS tunnels. The remaining 128 domains are suspicious
tunnel domains.
Some second-level domains still belong to compa-
nies e. g., allconnect.com, safedns.com, panorama9.com,
and eset.com. However, we also find suspicious domains
like engineershow.com, sharepoint-microsoft.co or newsfeeds-
microsoft.press. engineershow.com seems to be used by a
malware and the other two domains are IOCs of the group
Copy Kitten [60]. Also interesting is the domain wetun.nl,
which was used for a CTF where iodine traffic had to be
analyzed [61]. Among the remaining domains, it was possible
to find even more indicator of compromises (IOCs) used by
the Wekby APT group to tunnel data via DNS. We provide
further details in Section VI-B.
D. Other Resource Record Types
For the remaining types it is worth taking a closer look at
CNAME, as three of the five tested tools in Section IV-A also
support CNAME.
After prefiltering by type CNAME and applying our further
filter steps, 182,205 potential DNS tunnel domains remain.
This number of candidate domains is too large to be fully
inspected manually. Therefore, we examined the Top 100,
which account for almost 80 percent of all entries. These
domains contain domains related to companies, universities,
video streaming, and potential DNS tunnel domains. Never-
theless, we were unfortunately not able to identify any other
previously unknown DNS tunnel domains.
We did not take a closer look at the other types, as they
are not commonly used for DNS tunnels (as we discovered in
Section IV).
VI. CASE STUDIES
After identifying potential DNS tunnels in our data set, we
present two case studies about the utilization of DNS tunnels
used in Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) campaigns. An APT
is usually a targeted network attack in which unauthorized
persons gain access to a network and remain undetected as
long as possible [62]. Targets are often organizations with
valuable information, e. g., governments, manufacturers, or the
financial sector. The case studies confirm that even malicious
DNS tunnels are found through our approach and that this
is a real-world threat. Note, already known DNS tunnels are
the only way to show that our approach works since we do
not have ground truth data. However, the other potential DNS
tunnel domains detected in Section V are new and unknown.
A. APT 32
APT 32 (OceanLotus Group) is an APT group that was un-
covered in mid-May 2017 [26]. Through our filter approach for
identifying potential DNS tunnels, we identified four domains
used by APT 32 in August 2017 with type NULL. Figure 10
summarizes the occurrence of these second-level domains
per day. It is visible that the second-level domains found
by the introduced pDNS filtering approach (tonholding.com,
nsquery.net, gl-appspot.org, and facebook-cdn.net) are used
for data transmission (a large number of subdomains). The first
substantial use took place between August 18th and August
20th, i. e., a weekend (Friday to Sunday). The day with the
most requests was August 23rd (Wednesday). There is no clear
pattern at the time of use. A more extended analysis period
might be interesting to identify patterns in its usage. The most
requested domain during our records related to APT 32 is
gl-appspot.org (18.781 queries). However, facebook-cdn.net
(15.504 queries) seems to be important for the infrastructure
of APT 32 since it is used as email domain in the SOA records
of all other DNS tunnel APT 32 related domains.
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Figure 10. Distribution of identified malicious APT32 domains over time
(August 2017)
Through further research, we searched for all known indica-
tor of compromises (IOCs) [26] for APT 32 in our data set. We
were thus able to find three more second-level domains which
were used during our data collection time (shalaghlagh.tk, teri-
ava.com, ntpudateserver.com). The domain teriava.com seems
to represent a keepalive bit, as this domain was periodically
resolved once every other day during our measuring period.
The other domains were barely noticed. ntpudateserver.com
was spotted twice once with 19 entries on 07/17/2017 and once
with four entries on 08/11/2017, and shalaghlagh.tk only once
on 7/7/17 with two entries. We conclude that these domains
are not used for data transfer but probably implement C&C
communication.
B. Wekby
Wekby is a second APT group which used a DNS C2
communication channel in mid-2016 [25]. It is remarkable
that since that time no further evidence exists on the use
of this communication channel. For this reason, one might
believe that the APT group—or to be precise, the infrastructure
used for the particular campaign—is not active anymore.
Nevertheless, we observed with our global view of DNS
requests with new FQDNs that the DNS C2 infrastructure of
the Wekby group has been used two times in our measurement
period. This, in turn, means that the covert channel is still
active. We discovered domains belonging to Wekby with two
different resource record types (A and TXT). Figure 11 shows
the activities of the known Wekby second-level domains in our
data as a stacked bar chart. The infrastructure was used two
times, once between 17/07/26 and 17/07/31 and the second
time between 17/08/10 and 17/08/25.
VII. THREATS TO VALIDITY
In the following, we discuss several threats to validity and
limitations of our work. The first restriction of our work is
the focus on Farsight only as provider of pDNS data. Thus,
our global view is basically Farsight’s view on the DNS
ecosystem. Nevertheless, as far as we know, Farsight offers the
most comprehensive and complete view of DNS usage through
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Figure 11. Wekby activity over time for rrtype TXT and rrtype A
pDNS data. They further advertise to provide the largest real-
time actionable threat intelligence on Internet changes [7], and
previous work also used Farsight SIE for global views [35].
A further limitation is that we could not directly compare
our filter approach with other DNS tunnel detection ap-
proaches. However, a comparison without further adaptations
makes little sense, because we use a unique vantage point,
while existing work typically evaluated their approach on
internal networks. In our study, we examined DNS tunneling
from a global perspective (Farsight’s view) and not just locally
so that a comparison is not feasible. Additionally, to our
knowledge neither implementations nor data sets of existing
works are available for a direct comparison.
Furthermore, the approach to identify DNS tunneling
through the analysis and filtering of pDNS data has limita-
tions. Unfortunately, it is not possible to assign the domain
candidates to DNS tunnels with 100 % certainty, as we do
not have any ground truth on a global scale. To the best of
our knowledge, however, the indicators and behavior are most
likely DNS tunnel traffic.
The filter approach allows DNS tunnels that do not trans-
mit a lot of data, to be overlooked and wrongly filtered.
Our method is therefore only capable of robustly identifying
larger data transmissions inside hostnames from level four
and higher. Potential attackers may exploit this fact and can,
therefore, bypass our filter steps. However, data transmission
with low bandwidth are more difficult because data can no
longer be transmitted with bandwidth as large as possible.
Otherwise, we would detect the tunnel activity.
The assignment of domain candidates to DNS tunnel imple-
mentations is limited in the sense that we cannot confirm that
the candidates use the identified DNS tunnel implementation.
However, we can say that we find very similar structures and
thus have made the correct allocation with high probability.
Of course, an attacker could also use custom implementations
that bypass our heuristics.
The confirmation that domains have been maliciously ex-
ploited is based on news and blog posts and may not be
complete. However, we tried to collect the information as
systematically and thoroughly as possible.
Another constraint is that pDNS data analysis inspects
machine-to-machine communication only, i.e., in turn, we do
not know who is using a DNS tunnel and who is under attack.
However, since we wanted to learn in a first step whether DNS
tunnels are used for evil purposes at all in the wild, this is
not within the scope of our work. In future work, one may
try to encode the queries identified as DNS tunnels and thus
determine the content to draw further conclusions about the
individual use of the particular tunnel.
Finally, manual work must always be included to validate
the filtered domain candidates. However, this is fine, since
the number of candidates should be manageable for manual
analysis. If it is not the case, it is possible to miss potential
DNS tunnel domains.
VIII. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Since we have only used pDNS data for our analyses, we
have not stored or analyzed any personal data. This is only
the machine-to-machine communication of DNS servers. Fur-
thermore, we have made no effort to analyze the transmitted
data to identify potential senders or receivers or to learn what
information was transmitted.
IX. RELATED WORK
Work related to ours can be divided into three categories.
First, papers dealing with the detection of malicious domain
names, second measurement studies in the context of DNS,
and third articles in the field of DNS tunnels.
Detection of malicious domain usage: Past publications
already suggested systems to identify malicious domains based
on DNS information. Antonakakis et al. introduced Notos [63],
which analyzes pDNS data to detect a malicious domain
based on statistical features like the number of IP addresses
previously assigned to the domain or the number of malware
samples which reached out to the domain. Bilge et al. proposed
another system called Exposure [64], which uses a similar
approach but needs less training time and classifies domains
correctly, which were misclassified by Notos. These DNS
reputation systems focus on characteristics of the domain itself
or its usage. However, using DNS tunnels leads to different
patterns which these systems cannot detect. Additionally,
usage of a DNS tunnel is independent of the maliciousness
of the underlying domain so that it is not helpful.
Furthermore, Antonakakis et al. presented Kopis [65], a sys-
tem to detect malicious domains at a higher level of the DNS
hierarchy than Notos and Exposure. Thereby, they achieve
a global view and earlier detection of malicious domains.
Liu et al. used pDNS data analysis to detect the usage of
subdomains for malicious purposes [66]. In this technique,
referred to as shadow domains, malicious actors gain access to
legitimate domains, e.g., via phishing. Afterward, they register
additional subdomains, which benefit from the reputation
of the original domain when used. Compared to our work,
the detection mechanism’s approach is similar. However, our
detection mechanism takes individual characteristics of DNS
tunnels into account, e.g., the type of the resource record or
the length of the rdata field.
Measurement studies: Many measurements have already
investigated various aspects of DNS. Examples of recent work
are a study on interceptions [3], a study on censorship [4],
a study on dependencies [5], and about measurement chal-
lenges [6]. However, we are unfamiliar with any work that
takes a more detailed view on newly observed hostnames.
DNS tunnels: Several papers previously dealt with the
detection of DNS tunnels [9]–[22]. Homem and Papapetrou
presented a machine learning approach to discover protocols
being tunneled within the DNS [10]. Qi et al. described a
bigram based approach to detect DNS tunnels among regular
DNS traffic [9]. Aiello et al. presented a DNS tunnel detection
technique based on statistical fingerprints of DNS packet sizes
as well as the time-interval in between [11]. Accordingly,
various works exist; however, these works always require an
internal network view. No work uses pDNS data to analyze
the usage of DNS tunnels in the wild.
In particular, the work of Paxson et al. [8] is similar to our
work with regard to the identification of DNS tunnels. The
authors introduced a technique to identify DNS tunnels using
a configurable threshold of the amount of information within
an FQDN. For that, they presented a procedure to measure the
information content of DNS query streams. They evaluated
and determined this method empirically and were able to
detect 59 confirmed tunnels (2 from an enterprise network with
individual clients and 57 from aggregated clients). In addition
to enterprise networks, they also used data from Farsight (SIE)
for aggregated data. The first difference is that we first present
a study on newly observed hostnames. And even with the
filter steps, we utilize simpler attributes and filter functions
to detect DNS tunnels in our data. We do not measure the
information content in query streams, but only use attributes
such as the number of subdomains or the resource record type.
Another difference is that with our measurement study, we
examined the use of only new FQDN and focused on the
global utilization. In addition, we analyzed the malicious use
of two confirmed DNS tunnels in separate case studies.
Other publications already analyzed malware using DNS
tunnels for data exfiltration or C2 communication [50], [67]–
[69]. However, no paper deals with the worldwide use of DNS
tunnels for malicious purposes.
X. FUTURE WORK
We had only access to two months of data, while our method
could be applied to larger data sets. Therefore, for future work,
it is worth enlarging the analysis period by buying access to
the data feed to better understand the temporal evolution of the
use of newly observed hostnames. Additionally, an analysis of
another second pDNS source would be interesting to see if the
results change.
Since our results show that DNS tunnels are responsible
for a significant proportion of newly observed hostnames,
further analyses in the field of DNS tunnels might also be
interesting. In particular, a comparison of different approaches
to the identification of DNS tunnels could be performed. It
might also be of interest to investigate the transmitted data to
determine not only the actual usage but also the reason for
DNS tunneling. Last, the analysis of malware samples using
DNS tunnels may also be a promising option in the future.
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented new insights into the usage
of newly observed hostnames in the DNS via an empirical
measurement study. We showed that a small amount of second-
level domain names are responsible for a significant fraction of
the total amount of newly observed new hostnames every day.
In particular, Google’s AMP project, a DNS tunnel provider,
and Spotify are responsible for about half of all requests with
new hostnames on the Internet.
Furthermore, we demonstrated that it is possible to identify
DNS tunnels by analyzing passive DNS data feeds. We found
that the use of DNS tunneling is widespread and represents
a large proportion of type NULL and TXT requests. During
the filtering, according to type NULL, we were even able
to assign the remaining domain candidates to DNS tunnel
tools. The most used tool is iodine, and a large part of the
total DNS tunnel traffic belongs to the DNS tunnel provider
yourfreedom.com from Germany. With these results, we could
show that DNS tunneling is used in the wild and accounts
for a considerable fraction of the total number of DNS new
hostname queries. According to our findings, DNS requests in
particular of type NULL should be blocked as they are almost
entirely tunneling traffic.
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